



Christianity and Crisis

A Bi-Weekly Journal of Christian Opinion

Volume III, No. 17

October 18, 1943

\$1.50 per year; 10 cents per copy

The Roman Question Again

AT the time of the widespread rumors last July that the Vatican might completely change its attitude toward Russia, this journal commented on the nature of the Roman Church's policy and suggested that it is important for Protestants to understand it. The recent events in Italy make timely some further comments upon the whole Roman question. In America we find the matter confusing because we fail to realize that the Roman Church enters into the picture in three very distinct ways: the personal devotion of its people; the dogmatic basis of its policy, and its ordinary political activities.

That there is a great number of devoted Catholics of the finest type is known to us all. They are honorable and outstanding in their disciplined Christian lives, often putting to shame our careless Protestants. They are loyal Americans, have world-wide vision, and are ready to take part and leadership in every good work. We work with them and count on them. We know full well that the fundamentals of their faith are the same as ours.

But the situation is quite different when we turn to the Church as an organized body. Back of the faith which it holds in common with all other Christian bodies lies a faith concerning its ecclesiastical position which sets it apart from them. It is according to this dogma the one true Church. It is the only authentic guardian of the faith. It is the divinely appointed conscience of mankind and by divine appointment must rule the consciences of mankind. The emphasis falls on *rule*, for the whole structure is built around the Roman conception of law. The Church must therefore hold a privileged position in the State in order to fulfill its mission and in effect be the final arbiter among nations and peoples as it came to be in Western Europe during the Middle Ages. Many good Catholics and some great ones do not want this, but in spite of the changed world of modern times the claim of the Church has never been surrendered. "If her aspirations in the field of politics have become more modest," says Ferrero, "she has never completely given up the hope of an eventual condominium with Caesar."

The other aspect of this dogmatic basis is equally important. The Roman Church is itself an absolutism

of an authoritarian type. The people are ruled. The clergy who rule them are in turn ruled. All authority is ultimately centered in the Pope. The fact that any peasant lad (from Italy!) may rise to be Pope, that the process is thoroughly legal, and that the Pope is elected by the Cardinals does not make the Church democratic.

All this clarifies two sometimes puzzling aspects of Vatican policy. The first is that to which reference was made last July in connection with Russia. The Vatican's persistent political and diplomatic activity is always in the end directed towards securing a privileged position. That is why in the guise of a sovereign power it maintains a Secretariat of State and a diplomatic corps. That is why it seeks full diplomatic relations with the U. S. A. If that were achieved, it would make no difference in the actual life of the Church here; but it would have established a privileged position which sets it apart from other religious bodies.

The second outcome of this dogmatic position is a natural sympathy with the Fascist conception of the State. Of course the Church is bitterly opposed to the totalitarian state. It is itself spiritually totalitarian and cannot brook the intrusion of another absolutism. But Fascism does not necessarily mean complete totalitarianism. It is rule from above which may be tempered with a species of freedom. That is precisely what the Roman Church gives to its people. Indeed in democratic countries it must grant a certain freedom and its theologians may easily show that submission to the Church is the fullest freedom, which is true if the Church, as they assume, reveals exactly the will of God. But the Church's test of a civil government lies practically in the latter's readiness to deal with it. The Pope condemns Nazism but signs the Lateran Treaty with Mussolini, no doubt feeling that in the end the Church will gain more than it loses. He welcomes the Ethiopian and condones the Albanian and Greek adventures; he blesses Franco and through pressure from the Church here unquestionably is largely responsible for the American Government's tacit support of the Spanish revolution! He opens diplomatic relations with Japan. He welcomes the Fascist government of poor old Petain; in South

America, so far as we know, in spite of many noble and devoted Christian bishops and priests, the hierarchy which reflects the Vatican policy has never whole-heartedly led towards enlightenment and freedom for the people. That is certainly true in Mexico. Pius IX's *Syllabus of Errors* with its condemnation of democratic government and the freedoms which we have embodied in the Bill of Rights still stands.

All this has little or nothing to do with the religious life of the sincere American Catholic. But it has everything to do with the officially guided policies of his Church in America. A privileged position, dominant influence in national affairs, dominant guidance in international policy wherever the Vatican's interests are concerned are the American reflection of Vatican diplomacy, the outgrowth of the Church's dogmatic basis. To put it in an apt phrase (some one else coined): "The Roman Church will not submit itself to the democratic process." The illustrations are innumerable. During the Spanish Civil War the Church made every effort to block the presentation of the Republic's case, as many who sympathized with the fighting democrats found to their discomfort. Less than a year ago came the extraordinary suggestion from the American hierarchy that in the interests of the good neighbor policy, Protestant missionaries should be withdrawn from South America. The press is almost completely muzzled when it comes to any criticism of the Church. The radio will permit the most absurd attacks on Protestantism but any counter attack is only "intolerance."

For many years attacks on the Church came from sources which did not command the respect of the better class of citizen: A. P. A., KKK and the like; but of late in spite of admirable efforts like that of the Conference of Christians and Jews there seems to be increasing tension. High class Church papers and journals, like the *New Republic*, have admitted warnings to the Church. Anti-clericalism among Italian refugees has demanded a hearing. The Christian Front and the Coughlinites we hope belong on the fringe. They march with and fight with the violent anti-Catholic groups, but it is those who want tolerance and cooperation who are troubled now. There is always in the background that ominous dark cloud: the dogmatic position of the Church. Many of our Catholic fellow citizens do not see it; but it is there. The Protestant world instinctively feels it and is worried about it. Suspicion and distrust lead to violence. We must not have KKK's and A.P.A.'s. We want Catholic cooperation in building a great nation and a Christian world. But we are troubled. We understand the American Catholic's dilemma. He must find his own way out; we hope he can find it without disavowing democracy. E.L.P.

We Are in Peril

THERE is a widespread spirit of dejection and apprehension among thoughtful people both here and in Canada and Britain about the moral and political prospects of the post-war period. As military victory becomes more certain the danger that the victory will be robbed of its virtue seems to be growing.

The immediate reason for this general pessimism is the increasing evidence that an accord with Russia, broad enough to guarantee a stable world, is a desperately difficult achievement, and may be beyond the resources of present statesmanship. No one imagines that an understanding between the Anglo-Saxon powers and Russia would necessarily give us a just peace, any more than it is assumed that an understanding between ourselves and Britain would guarantee peace. A mere Anglo-Saxon alliance would degenerate into Anglo-Saxon imperialism. A mere understanding between the Western powers and Russia might lead to a super-imperialism. Both these steps require the larger framework of an international system in which all nations will find their rightful place. Yet both steps—the understanding between ourselves and Britain and the further understanding between the two English-speaking nations and Russia—are the necessary preconditions of the larger achievement.

The differences between ourselves and Russia have obviously been growing, or at least they have been becoming more apparent. The conference of foreign ministers may be able to resolve them but they seem, at the moment, quite basic. They have been focused in recent weeks upon a divergence of policy in regard to Germany. Russia has, through the "Free German" committee, ostentatiously challenged the allied policy of "unconditional surrender." Pro-Russian circles have hailed this policy as one of great enlightenment in contrast to the stupidity of offering the Germans, who would like to throw off Nazism, no inducement at all. But the real point is that both policies are equally bad. The Russian policy very likely means peace with the German Army; our policy may mean the dismemberment of Germany. If this is not what it means, no assurances have been given which would allay the apprehensions of democratic Germans, or for that matter, of other democratic forces upon the continent.

The situation is that the lack of any clear-cut policy for either Germany or the continent as a whole has spread dismay upon the whole European continent. A distinguished continental church leader has recently borne testimony to the very wide-spread lack of confidence in the leadership of the Anglo-

Saxon powers upon the continent. Our lack of policy has incidentally made political warfare almost impossible. We have nothing but vague phrases to offer to the people of Europe. The Russians seem to have rushed into the vacuum created by our lack of policy. They seemed at one time to favor a policy of isolation behind strategic frontiers. That policy would have been dangerous enough for any final peace. But it has, in recent months, given way to a policy of exerting strong influence upon the continent. Their bold bid for the favor of the French Liberation Committee is one aspect of this policy. Their German strategy is another. While the Russian program for Germany is couched in democratic phrases there is reason to believe that it means the possibility of peace with the military caste of Germany provided it is completely purged of Nazism.

The fact that neither the Russian nor the allied program represents a real solution for the German problem, serious as it is, must be subordinated to the even graver fact that a conflict of policy which will prevent a basic accord between Russia and the West will be fatal to prospects of a lasting peace.

It is foolish to hold either side completely responsible for the present difficulties. The Russians are

not solely responsible; for the Anglo-Saxon powers have either lacked a consistent continental policy completely, or they have given suggestions of a policy looking toward the conservative reconstruction of the continent, obliquely directed against Russia. We are, however, not solely responsible because a rising Russian nationalism, in which communism is no longer a danger but which knows how to use the remnants of communist ideology in Europe as a power instrument of Russian policy, will make an accord with Russia, difficult at best.

In this desperate situation the peoples of the world seem to be getting little help from their leaders. Both Roosevelt and Churchill seem to be preoccupied with military strategy. Woodrow Wilson may have planned too abstractly for a community of nations. But his vision of a world settlement is now desperately needed. However the great decisions of history are not merely made by leaders. It is time that the people of the nations make their wishes known and prod the leaders. If we do not take significant steps within the next months for the creation of a real community of nations, we may lose the peace even before we have won the war.

R. N.

Russian People, Church and State

PAUL B. ANDERSON

ON September 12th, 1943, there was great rejoicing in Moscow, for on that day the Orthodox Church celebrated the enthronement of a new Patriarch. The new incumbent is Sergei who, as Metropolitan of Moscow and Kolomna, has been holder of the responsibilities but not the title of Patriarch since the late autumn of 1926.

It was a foregone conclusion that Metropolitan Sergei, who for sixteen years had supervised the destinies of the Church, should be elected Patriarch. Indeed when the 3,000 people at the service cried "axios, axios" (he is worthy), in the traditional custom, a true word was spoken.

The event is of great significance. It marks a great advance in the position of the Church: the cordiality of the reception by Stalin and Molotov will set the tone for relations between Church and State; the faithful will have less fear in applying for registration of new congregations and the use of church buildings (about one tenth are now in use for religious purposes); religious and political unity will strengthen the relations between the people of Russia and the Slav populations of the Balkans; any negotiations for concordat with the Vatican would find the Eastern Orthodox Church on more solid ground for defending its position, while the friendly attitude of the Russian Church toward other Orthodox Churches and even toward the Anglican

Church and the ecumenical movement will give hope for further advance along this line.

Yet this event must be viewed in the light not only of historical but also of philosophical or theoretical considerations. In agreeing to the election of a Patriarch, the Government has made no change in its theoretical attitude toward religion. Its action is chiefly a recognition of the political loyalty of Christians and of the Church in Russia. We need to be reminded that this loyalty was professed by Patriarch Tikhon as early as 1923, and reaffirmed by Metropolitan Sergei in his declaration of June 10, 1927. His words on that occasion may well be quoted now, because of their description of the fundamental elements involved, touching Church, people and the State.

"Thus receiving the right to legal existence, we clearly take account of the fact that with rights we also take on obligations with reference to the authorities who give us these rights—and thus I have taken on myself, in the name of the whole of our Orthodox old-Church (Tikhon) hierarchy and flock, to register before the Soviet authorities our sincere readiness to be fully law-abiding citizens of the Soviet Union, loyal to the Government and definitely to hold ourselves aloof from all political parties or enterprises seeking to harm the Union. But let us be sincere to the end. We cannot be silent about

the contradiction which exists between us Orthodox and the Communist Bolsheviks, who govern our Union. They set as their purpose struggle with God and His power in the hearts of the people. We on our part see the whole sense and whole aim of our existence in confession of the faith in the hearts of the people. They recognize only the materialistic interpretation of history, and we believe in the Providence of God. In spite of this, we are convinced that the Orthodox Christian, sacredly observing his faith and living according to its precepts, for this very reason will be, always and everywhere, a desirable and exemplary citizen of any State, including that of the Soviets. . . ."

Throughout a thousand years of Russian history there has been a peculiar interplay between her people, her Church and the holders of state authority. Each has claimed sovereignty over the whole being what we call Russia—her body and will—endeavoring to mold the whole into a single substance. Each has depended on the other two elements of national life, but has nevertheless sought mastery over them. The persistent tension generated between these fundamental claimants to authority has been impossible of resolution, because each has had its peculiar national form and essence, and each has refused to concede that the forms and essence of the other two should take precedence over it. The Russian people throughout history have been principally concerned with their local economy and social organization; the people have not sought conquest, and have even accepted foreign overlords, but they have resisted these overlords, whether they were Russian or foreign whenever their household and village economy has been threatened.

Great as were the achievements of Peter in extending Russian borders to the Baltic and in westernizing national administration, the result of thus clamping down a framework that conflicted with the native order, held immemorially by the peasants, could only have been the constant peasant uprisings that characterized the reign of Catherine II, and the distress which government and anti-government reformers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries tried vainly to overcome.

Alongside of this tension between the people and the political sovereign, there was a similar struggle between the people and the Church. This is not to imply that the people were irreligious and therefore opposed to the Church, or even that the Orthodox Church teaching was foreign to the people. The Russian people have historically been congenitally religious, with a rich capacity for comprehending and enjoying not only spiritual things in general but Christian teaching in particular. Under the Tsars every Russian subject had to be registered as member of one or another religious body. One might well have expected a vast falling away when the

Revolution came, and especially when State sanction turned into official scorn of religion. Yet it would now appear that the proportion of the population in the U.S.S.R. still adhering to religion today is scarcely smaller than in England, France or in the United States.

This religiousness has given the people a strong claim to authority in the Church. Other circumstances have favored this position. Christianity came to Russia from Byzantium, where the Church has always held to the patristic rule of depending on the whole body of the faithful for the testing of revelation and determination of doctrine. The Russian people have clung to this rule and insisted that the Primate of the hierarchy should not arrogate full religious authority to themselves. The Russian word "sobornost" (conciliarity, unity in spirit) must enter our vocabulary at this point to facilitate our comprehending how the believing laity in Russia have felt themselves to be essential parties to any decision involving doctrine or order in the Church. This is not a feeling of "priesthood of all believers," but an assertion of the Orthodox view that lay is not secular, that truth abides in the whole body of the Christ's Church, and not only in those holding sacerdotal office. It is not congregationalism, with decisions taken by majority vote. The voice of the people has influence in the Councils of the Church in the measure of its spiritual quality. Doctrine, Church order, the treasury of divine truth called Tradition or, by Father Bulgakoff, Living Tradition, depend upon apperception and acceptance by the people over a long period of time, and require only confirmation by the assembled Council of the Church.

The Russian people thus came to regard themselves as the guardians of the faith and traditions of the Church, and to resent or reject changes proposed by virtue of ecclesiastical authority. When Isidore, Metropolitan of Moscow, returned from the Council of Florence in 1439, where he had associated himself with the decision for reunion of the Eastern and Western Churches, the people would have none of it and threw him out. During the Polish occupation of Kievan territory, the lay people formed themselves into Orthodox Brotherhoods to preserve their faith and hierarchy, resisting the Unia proposed by Rome, which would have allowed them to retain their Orthodox form of worship and the married priesthood, but would have required their falling under the jurisdiction of the Pope of Rome.

There were, and are, several millions of sectarians in Russia, but these in the main are the exception which prove the rule that the Church and people are one. Since the fifteenth century there have been wrestlers of the spirit, with followers for a generation or a century, along with Evangelical Christians who depend on the Book, as well as rationalists

whose world-view conflicts with the Byzantine faith. Even within Orthodoxy there have been frequent exaggerations of doctrine nearing upon heresy. The Church of Russia has been loathe to accept the defection of any of these schismatic or sectarian groups, for it has held to the principle that to be Russian was to be Orthodox, and though some may err for a time, their home is still within the true fold. Russia has only one faith, according to Orthodox tradition. The Church's difficulty has grown out of the fact that the ruling hierarchy, by failing to hearken to the voice of the faithful, became separated from them in spirit; and, being thus separated, instead of seeking earnestly for reconciliation in the spirit of "sobornost," turned to the State for support, and so widened the rift not only between themselves and the people, but between the people and State as well.

However, the Church has had its own struggle with the State. The hierarchy has often sided with the people against the State, as in the case of the noble Patriarch Philip, whom Ivan the Terrible martyred for this cause. Nor must it be supposed, as is commonly assumed, that the bishops, priests and monks of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were all mere tools of the State. It is true that the Tsars after Peter's reforms controlled the administrative apparatus of the Church; and the local clergy in Russia, as in many other countries, fulfilled certain civil functions, such as maintaining birth and death records. But the Tsar did not and could not control the people's piety or suppress the developing thought and life of the Church. Many priests and bishops resisted their superiors both in the Church and in the State in order to join with the people in seeking justice, enlightenment and social advance.

Up to 1905, however, the difference between Church and State expressed itself less in conflict than in following their respective natures. Some tried to build up the cult of the Tsar, but the greatest esteem and reverence of the people were reserved for spiritual leaders. The Orthodox intellectuals produced their own prophets: Khomiakoff, whose writings provide a reasoned exposition of "sobornost," Vladimir Solovieff, the philosopher of the Universal Church, and the galaxy of publicists, scholars and social philosophers who in 1901-2 discussed in the St. Petersburg Religious Philosophical Meetings views on Church and society which are of profound significance today. In this group were the present head of the Russian Church, Patriarch Sergei, also Berdyaev, Merezhkovsky and Kartasheff. In this company, in a similar group in Moscow, and in gatherings of lesser lights around countless samovars all over Russia, religion was alive, growing, seeking that fusion of mind and spirit which provides our nearest approach to truth. The Church was not bounded by the limits set by the Tsar or even by

the bishops and clergy. The people of Russia, through their natural and unelected representatives, were carrying the responsibilities which Christ had left to His Church.

It was not easy for the Church to adapt itself to the Separation that came in 1917. Since the days of Constantine, its relation to the State had been one of consanguinity, not of contract. But with the Soviets came a state power in whose veins ran only the cold stream of positivism and militant atheism, desiring complete separation. The crisis in the tension between Church and State reached its peak. The Church had to surrender its principle of theocracy, a relationship of blood and spirit; it had to make over its concept of itself, had to become a new personality before it could even attempt reconciliation with the Soviet Government.

One of the amazing facts in Russian history is the accomplishment of this change of personality by the Russian Church in the course of five brief years. It took five years more of testing, after Patriarch Tikhon's declaration of loyalty, before his successor, who is now the Patriarch Sergei, was able to convince the State that the Church really was a new person, with whom a rational contract could be made. However, in 1927 Metropolitan Sergei entered into an agreement with the State whereby the central Church administration was given legal right to exist. The people played their part in this, for it was their rejection of the officially sponsored Living Church movement which showed the government that the people did not want the revolution in vestments.

By the early '30's the situation was clarified in many respects. (1) Nationalization of Church property of all kinds was completed. (2) The 200,000 men and women forming the parish clergy and monastics were, like the kulaks, dispersed "as a class." (3) Legislation had been passed restricting Church activity to the conduct of the cult, without educational or social functions. By these three measures the power of the Church was broken. (4) The clergy left in office proved to be loyal and useful citizens, according to Stalin's own declaration in 1936. (5) In filling out the census sheets in 1937, we are told about half the population declared themselves to be religious. (6) Historians of the Soviet Academy of Science became convinced that Christianity, the monasteries, the Church, the missionaries, had been forces of great positive value in bringing culture not only to Kiev but to the broad reaches of the Russian land. This historical data began to affect Soviet policy as early as 1934. In general, the tension was greatly released.

The war has brought out clearly the present status of relationships between Church, people and State. In the summer of 1941, Metropolitan Sergei made a plea for Christians to pray for all who fight for the fatherland, not only for relatives and friends.

In this he reaffirmed the historical position, that the Church is guardian of the souls of all the Russian people even, as he said "if they do not wish to be prayed for." The State authorized the publication of this appeal, and also put the government radio at the disposal of the Church for calling the people to the defence of Russia. The people have requested the reopening of additional churches (about one-tenth are now in use), and increasingly they turn to the Church for her ministrations. People, Church and State stand together against the enemy.

Does this mean that the historic tension has been overcome, that the great body of the Russian people, the Soviet Government's will to communism, and the Russian soul which sings and prays in the Church of Christ, have found a synthesis, a harmonious balance that will last through future generations?

According to Marxist theory, religion is the product and concomitant of human frustration in the face of unsurmountable distress and oppression. Religion is merely co-existent with frustration, and will vanish as distress is removed by science and oppression by the socialist order. Recognizing that society is not yet free from distress and oppression, especially during the horrors of front and guerilla fighting and the evacuation of some forty million people to the forests and steppes, the Marxists, by their own logic, recognize that religion still has a place in Soviet life. Hence they have suspended anti-religious propaganda and allowed the Church to elect a Patriarch. This does not mean a change in attitude toward religion, but a reasonable expression of the true Marxist attitude.

In the spring of 1943, Kalinin, titular head of the Soviet State, made the following statement: "We must remember that we do not persecute anyone for religion. We believe that religion is a misguiding institution and struggle against it by education. But since religion still grips considerable sections of the population and some people are deeply religious, we cannot combat it by ridicule. Of course, if some young people find it amusing, that is not so terrible. But we must not allow it to develop into mockery."

A great contradiction between religion and communism appears when we consider the bases of truth, freedom and morality. For communism, truth is the product of dialectic thinking, not something that proceeds from God, for there is no God. By the same token, the good does not spring from God, but is the rationally determined policy which strengthens the class struggle and favors the establishing of the communist era. The ideas of sin and salvation are entirely foreign to communist thought. Freedom is complete when it serves the class struggle. This is not to say that communism has no morals. On the contrary, the standards of personal behavior approach prudery, and social relations

among citizens are essentially based on sympathy and consideration. These standards, however, no longer apply when dealing with the class enemy; he is to be ostracized (exiled), punished (forced labor), and destroyed if he is actually or potentially dangerous.

If we follow Marxist philosophy, both the state and religion are thus doomed to vanish for they will have no functions to perform in the eventual communist society. However, we must face the fact that the war has proved a great set-back for the achievement of communism. And as Stalin made particularly plain in his address to the Eighteenth Party Congress in March 1939, the existence of a capitalist environment would continue to have great influence on internal Soviet development. Here is where the settlement in Europe and the determination of relations between the Soviet Union and other nations will have their effect on internal affairs in Russia. Naturally the Soviet State cannot remain passive in such a fluid situation as the present. This raises the whole question of the expansion of socialism, and with it the question as to whether the Soviet State would have the backing and integrated support of the Russian people and of their Church in an adventure abroad, as it has had in the defense of Russian territories.

It is easily possible to show from history current expressions of the feelings of the Russian people that they feel their destiny to lie within their own borders with the exception along two lines: punishment of Axis perpetrators of atrocities, and the establishment of friendly states along the Russian border. In these objectives there is no conflict of interest between Russian people, Church and State, or between them collectively and the Allied nations. If, therefore, a reasonable definition of objectives and a fair scheme of our respective responsibilities in the reconstruction process can be arrived at, we can all face the future with hope. The distinction and tension between socialist and capitalist economy will still be obtained but the consequence of this tension can be the stimulation of vastly improved conditions for the people under both systems, if right-minded men and women earnestly seek for the true objects of life. In any case, the problem in Russia will be resolved by the Russian people and their ideas. The same can be true with reference to the people of the United States if they take themselves and their tasks with equal seriousness.

Russia will still have the greater problem, for nowhere as in Russia has there been such a sense of unity in diversity, of tension between inter-dependent elements, of interplay between political, economic and spiritual, of the struggle between the eternal and the temporal, the spiritual and the material. Russia has had her full share of foreign wars, but her history is and will be primarily a record of internal struggle between these forces.

The World Church: News and Notes

Joint Catholic, Jewish and Protestant Declaration on World Peace

An identical statement giving seven basic principles of peace for the post-war world has been signed by 47 Catholic archbishops, bishops, priests and laity, by 47 representative rabbis and laity and by 50 leaders of Protestant communions and national organizations. The statement is as follows:

1. *The moral law must govern world order.* The organization of a just peace depends upon practical recognition of the fact that not only individuals but nations, states, and international society are subject to the sovereignty of God and to the moral law which comes from God.

2. *The rights of the individual must be assured.* The dignity of the human person as the image of God must be set forth in all its essential implications in an international declaration of rights, and be vindicated by the positive action of national governments and international organization. States as well as individuals must repudiate racial, religious, or other discrimination in violation of those rights.

3. *The rights of oppressed, weak or colonial peoples must be protected.* The rights of all peoples, large and small, subject to the good of the organized world community, must be safeguarded within the framework of collective security. The progress of undeveloped, colonial, or oppressed peoples toward political responsibility must be the object of international concern.

4. *The rights of minorities must be secured.* National governments and international organization must respect and guarantee the rights of ethnic, religious, and cultural minorities to economic livelihood, to equal opportunity for educational and cultural development, and to political equality.

5. *International institutions to maintain peace with justice must be organized.* An enduring peace requires the organization of international institutions which will (a) develop a body of international law; (b) guarantee the faithful fulfilment of international obligations, and revise them when necessary; (c) assure collective security by drastic limitation and continuing control of armaments, compulsory arbitration and adjudication of controversies, and the use when necessary of adequate sanctions to enforce the law.

6. *International economic cooperation must be developed.* International economic collaboration to assist all states to provide an adequate standard of living for their citizens must replace the present economic monopoly and exploitation of natural resources by privileged groups and states.

7. *A just social order within each state must be achieved.* Since the harmony and well-being of the world community are intimately bound up with the internal equilibrium and social order of the individual states, steps must be taken to provide for the security of the family, the collaboration of all groups and classes in the interest of the common good, a standard of living adequate for self-development and family life, decent

conditions of work, and participation by labor in decisions affecting its welfare.

This declaration is issued not by religious boards but by recognized religious leaders of the country. Among the signers are: Rt. Rev. Henry St. George Tucker, Rev. Henry Sloane Coffin, Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, Rev. William P. Merrill, Rt. Rev. G. Ashton Oldham, Dr. Israel Goldstein, Dr. Louis Finkelstein, Dr. Julian Morgenstern, Dr. Stephen S. Wise, Most Rev. Edward Mooney, Most Rev. Samuel Alphonsus Stritch, Most Rev. Karl J. Alter.

Communication

September 30, 1943.

Dear Sir:

In your issue of June 28 Dr. Henry A. Atkinson, Chairman of the Christian Council on Palestine, published an article entitled "The Jewish Problem Is a Christian Problem." In your publication of August 9 Mr. Wilbert B. Smith countered with another viewpoint which he termed "The Arab Problem Is a Christian Problem." As Executive Secretary of the Christian Council on Palestine, may I venture an answer to Mr. Smith.

Mr. Smith's article arrives at the startling and tragic conclusion that, since a conflict between Jew and Arab seems inevitable, the Jews must surrender their aspirations for a Jewish national home in Palestine, a homeland promised to them by some fifty-two nations, including our own, at the conclusion of the first World War. Mr. Smith is deeply concerned by recent Arab propaganda hostile to Jewish activities in Palestine. His attitude is not dissimilar to that of many another liberal who, in the past ten years, has shrunk from conflict and has counselled capitulation to threats of force and violence. This attitude contributed greatly to the retreat of civilization during the 1930's when well-meaning men thought they could avert conflict by refusing to recognize its existence. Thus Mr. Smith yields to the propaganda of the Arabs and arrives at the all too simple conclusion that it is unnecessary to set up a Jewish state anywhere. He would have the Jews doomed to a continuation of their millennial homelessness. The Jewish problem is solved by ignoring the Jewish people, an easy solution made all the easier by doing nothing to stem the tides of anti-Semitism or stopping the studied cruelty and cold murder of the Nazis. We are urged to ignore and forget those who have been destroyed simply because we are frightened by the threatened conflict between Jews and Arabs. A statesmanlike policy would recognize the sources of this conflict and try to deal with them fairly.

While Mr. Smith concedes that the Jews have "an ancient moral claim to Palestine," he argues that the "Arabs have a similar claim plus centuries of actual residence." This statement can be disputed. The Arab connection with Palestine has been greatly exaggerated. Historically, Palestine never had more than a small Arab population, and there were only 437 years of Arab rule in the course of 3,000 years of recorded history. From 171 A.D. on, Palestine was conquered and subju-

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A Bi-Weekly Journal of Christian Opinion
601 West 120th St., New York 27, N. Y.

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gated by various peoples, such as the Seldjugs, the Kurds, the Crusaders, the Egyptians, the Mamelukes and finally the Ottoman Turks. The Arab population in Palestine did not begin to grow until the 1880's. In fact, a careful analysis of the present Palestinian population would show that about 75 per cent of the Arabs are either immigrants themselves or descendants of persons who immigrated into Palestine during the last 100 years, for the most part in the last 61 years since 1882.

That latter date of 1882 is significant because it is the date on which Jewish immigration into Palestine began. Prior to Jewish immigration, Palestine was an area of desolate countryside and dilapidated towns, and during the whole period of Arab life in Palestine the country showed scarcely a single Arab achievement. In the war to liberate Palestine in 1917-18 the Palestinian Arabs did little to overthrow their Turkish rulers. They neither tilled the soil nor fought for its redemption. Arab interest in Palestine began with its restoration by the Jews, and Arabs have benefited greatly by the establishment of the Jewish national home.

Lawrence of Arabia, the great protagonist of the Arabs, prophesied that the Jews "by the exercise of their skill and capital hoped to make Palestine as highly organized as a European state. The success of the scheme will involve inevitably the raising of the present Arab population to their own material level. It might well prove a source of technical supply rendering them independent of industrial Europe and, in that case, a new confederation might become a formidable element of world power; however, such a contingency will not be for the first, or even for the second generation, but it must be borne in mind in any laying out of the foundations of empire in Western Asia. These, to a large extent, must stand or fall by the course of Zionist effort."

The record confirms Lawrence's prophecy of a quarter century ago. The impartial survey by the Peel Commission in 1937 offers this testimony: "It is difficult to detect any deterioration in the economic position

of the Arab upper class. . . . We are also of the opinion that until now the Arab population has benefited on the whole from the work of the British Administration and from the presence of the Jews in the country. Wages have gone up. The standard of living has improved. . . . The large import of Jewish capital into Palestine has had a general fructifying effect upon the economic life of the whole country. . . . The reclamation and anti-malarial works undertaken in the Jewish colonies have benefited all the Arabs in the neighborhood. Broadly speaking, the Arabs have shared to a considerable degree in the material benefits which our administration has brought to Palestine. . . . The Arab charge that the Jews have obtained too large a proportion of good land cannot be maintained. Much of the land now carrying orange groves was sand dunes or swamps, and was uncultivated when it was purchased. . . ."

The Arabs today have vast territories—more than a million square miles—a great part of them habitable and capable of development. The Jews have none. Out of the last war the Arabs gained freedom and independence, for Iraq, Saudi Arabia and later Trans-Jordan, and this in part was due to the insistence of the United States which urged justice for the Arabs, even as it urged justice for the Jews. The Arabs are destined to make new great gains at the conclusion of this conflict, and in no small part they may thank the Jewish soldiers and workers of Palestine who laid down their lives to help repel Rommel when his tanks were thundering across Egypt.

For the Arabs to permit a Jewish State in Palestine, "a tiny notch" in the vast Arab expanse, involves no sacrifice to the Arabs; on the contrary, it provides them with a progressive and democratic neighbor eager to create a joint future in which the hopes of both peoples may be realized. For the Jews to give up Palestine would be to invite a new calamity for a people whose great misfortune is its homelessness. To this problem the Christian world must bring a realistic understanding and a resolution to act. It must not become enfeebled in discussion or paralyzed by mere threats of conflict.

CARL HERMANN VOSS,
Executive Secretary.

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